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By Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld
Hohfeld's writings, from 1913 and 1917, delve into the differences among such felony options as privilege and responsibility, and correct, immunity and legal responsibility, and so forth.
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Extra info for Fundamental legal conceptions, as applied in judicial reasoning (A Yale paperbound)
Not until Cardozo undertook the job of re-interpretation of the fundamental point of view (beginning in 1925) may one regard sociological jurisprudence as even beginning to win general acceptance among the body of the guild. This calls for explanation. The needs of the times were there, and felt. Sociological jurisprudence ought, it would seem, to have found an early echo. I find a number of factors to which one might appeal, yet have no great confidence in any of them being operative. The “law” under discussion was the law of the schools, and the law of the schools had for some decades been divorced from life.
The bird’s-eye is his eye; history unfolds through that eye, when the subject perceives the subject as “other”! This perception mechanism becomes especially clear when judges are involved in name giving: cases and names form one and the same identity before Llewellyn’s legally skilled eye. Legal realism is based on this semantic process, which creates identity through the jurisprudential conditio sine qua non of cases. Cases are given names and they become signs through those given names. Once they are named signs in the great common law, they sustain the life of law and citizens under the rule of (the common) law.
And even as some realists tried to “eliminate the normative character of law and [attempt] to reduce law to the actual conduct . . of judges,” Hommes argues (1979: 312), legal norms “happen to occupy and essential and undeniable position in legal life” – they cannot be reduced to facts. Recourse to social well-being, the ideal of justice, human needs, or normative generalizations – each of them a highly contested conception – only serves to revive the natural law impulse identified by Llewellyn in the history of American legal philosophy.